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An Analysis of Executive Compensation 
in Small Businesses'*'
Kathleen A. Farrell* 
University of Nebraska -  Lincoln
and
Drew B. Winters**
Texas Tech University
Using a broad-based sample of small businesses, we analyze the relation between accounting- 
based firm performance measures and executive compensation for S-corporations, and C- 
corporations. After controlling for the potential endogeneity associated with the choice of 
organizational form, we find a positive relation between executive pay and ROA in S- 
corporations and C-corporations. We also find a positive relation between executive pay and 
total asset turnover but the relation is stronger for S-corporations. We document a positive
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relation between executive salaries and more diffuse ownership, owner managers, and when the 
founder is the current owner. We find a negative relation between executive salaries and firms 
with greater than fifty percent family ownership.
I. Introduction and motivation
Executive compensation issues attract attention in both the academic and political 
arenas. Much of the public interest focuses on escalating compensation for CEOs of publicly 
traded companies with an increased divergence in pay between CEOs and lower level 
employees. As described by Murphy (1999), the academic literature has evolved primarily 
because of the emergence and general acceptance of agency theory and the increased 
accessibility to executive compensation data. In general, studies find that compensation 
increases with firm size and executive compensation is positively related to firm performance 
(e.g., Lewellen and Huntsman, 1970; Ciscel and Carroll, 1980; Murphy, 1985), although the 
economic magnitude of the change in pay relative to performance has been questioned (Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990). In addition, studies have focused on firm characteristics that impact both 
compensation levels and compensation structure (e.g., Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and 
Gaver, 1993).
The current compensation literature focuses on large, publicly traded firms. For the 
most part, a void exists in the literature regarding small firm compensation practices, partially 
due to the difficulty in obtaining data on compensation in small, privately held firms. Also, 
small firms tend to have less pronounced agency problems since many small firms have 
owner/managers. Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b) argue that the residual claims of privately 
held firms are largely restricted to owner/managers or to agents, such as family members or 
business associates, with a special relationship with the owner. Therefore, they argue that 
agency problems between owners and managers may be mitigated in privately held firms. 
However, not all privately held firms are run by owner/managers in which case the agency 
problems may still exist with a need for owners to monitor management (e.g., Ang, Cole and 
Lin, 2000).
Only recently has research begun to focus on closely held firms and the unique 
incentive problems they may face. For example. Bates, Jandik and Lehn (2000) analyze the 
promotion incentives (tournament theory) and executive compensation of executives in family- 
controlled public firms and find that non-family executives in family owned firms are faced 
with diminished promotion incentives. In their study of publicly-traded and privately-held 
property-liability insurance companies, Ke et al. (1999) find a positive, significant relation 
between CEO pay and ROA in publicly-traded insurers but the relation is insignificant for 
privately-held insurers. They conclude that privately-held insurers do not rely on compensation 
contracts linking pay to accounting based performance to mitigate agency problems but instead 
may rely on direct monitoring combined with subjective performance measurement.
Focusing on privately-held small C corporations, Cavalluzzo and Sankaraguruswamy 
(2005) find evidence that executive compensation is more closely related to sales to assets in 
privately-held small corporations with more disperse ownership than those with more 
concentrated ownership. They also find that the sensitivity of compensation to sales to assets is 
weaker if the firm is a family owned business and the manager is a shareholder.
The goal of this paper is to analyze the unique issues faced by small firms that are 
organized as C-corporations and S-corporations. These organizational forms differ in their 
ownership structures, tax treatment, and in the type of agency problems they face. Specifically,
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we analyze the factors that influence the compensation structure of small firms while 
considering the intra-dependence between the choice of organizational form and the optimal 
structure of compensation contracts.
Our paper differs from Cavalluzzo and Sankaraguruswamy (2005) in the following 
ways. First, we analyze both S and C Corporations and restrict our sample to firms with less 
diffuse ownership. Specifically, we exclude C corporations (approximately five percent of the 
C-corporate sample observations) with more than thirty shareholders. Our goal is to compare 
small firm compensation practices while controlling for diffuse ownership of C corporations. 
Second, when we investigate the relation between executive pay and different accounting based 
firm performance measures for privately held firms, we control for the potential endogeneity 
associated with the choice to organize as an S-corporation and a C-corporation and 
compensation practices using two stage least squares.
We conduct our tests on the data from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business 
Finances (NSSBF) sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board and the Small Business 
Administration. The survey is of a nationally representative sample of small businesses with 
less than 500 employees and contains 4,637 usable survey responses (according to 
PriceWaterhouse). Specifically, we analyze S-corporations and privately-held C-corporations.^
Consistent with previous studies of large publicly traded companies, we find a positive 
relation between firm size and executive salaries for our full sample of privately-held firms. 
We also find a positive relation between executive salaries and return on assets independent of 
organizational form. Decomposing return on assets into profit margin and total asset turnover, 
we find a positive relation between executive salaries and total asset turnover. However, when 
we interact corporate form with total asset turnover, the result suggests that C corporations pay 
less for the efficient use of assets relative to S corporations. Therefore, our results are more 
consistent with Holmstrom’s (1979) second best solution to the contracting problem which 
suggests using imperfect estimators of an agent's actions when complete monitoring is 
impossible or prohibitively costly. In the case of S corporations and C corporations, total asset 
turnover appears to be the better proxy for cash flows available to owners than ROA, which is 
more typically used for large publicly traded firms, even after controlling for owner managers, 
family ownership and diffuse ownership. Our results differ firom Ke, et.al. (1999) who find that 
privately-held insurers do not rely on compensation contracts linking pay to accounting based 
performance to mitigate agency problems. It may be that agency costs and/or information 
asymmetry problems are less severe in the insurance industry and thus, Ke, et. al.’s findings 
can not be generalized to a broad based sample of privately held small firms.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss the characteristics of 
different organizational forms and the implications with respect to compensation practices. In 
Section III, we describe the data and our empirical model. Section IV includes a discussion of 
our results followed by our conclusions in Section V.
II. Different organizational forms
Since our focus is on executive compensation across different organizational forms of 
small businesses, we begin with a discussion of the characteristics associated with S-
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the survey data, none of the sole proprietorships provide the accounting data from the survey questions necessary 
to be included in this study. Similarly, partnerships do not provide sufficient compensation data to be included in 
this study.
corporations and C-corporations. Drawing on the differences in firm structure, we describe the 
theoretical arguments that may predict compensation contracts across these different 
organizational forms. Then we discuss firm performance measures available for small 
businesses.
2.1 Characteristics of different organizational forms
A corporation is a legal entity created by a state that is distinct from its owners and 
managers, has unlimited life, ease of transferability of ownership and limited liability. S- 
corporation, as defined by Subchapter S in the Internal Revenue Code, is a federal income tax 
election made by a corporation by filing a form with the IRS. Otherwise, the S-corporation is 
formed in the same manner as a C-corporation under state law. The election is limited to firms 
that currently have 100 or fewer stockholders for tax years beginning in 2004 (per CCH 
Business Owners Toolkit). In 1993, the date of our sample, the restriction was for 35 or fewer 
stockholders (Denis and Sarin, 2002). S-corporate status requires the corporation to be 
domestic and the firm may issue only one class of stock. Subchapter S shareholders may not be 
nonresident aliens or a nonhuman entity. After the ownership restrictions, an S-corporation can 
be considered a hybrid organizational form that combines characteristics of a regular 
corporation and a partnership. Unhke a C-corporation, an S-corporation does not pay corporate 
income tax, but instead passes all of its income on to the stockholders for payment of taxes in a 
manner similar to a partnership. The income of a S corporation is subject to only one tax, at the 
individual level. Unlike the S corporation, the C corporation shareholders have the tax benefit 
of deferring taxes on income retained in the firm. If earnings are not paid out as dividends, 
they are not taxed at the personal level until the shareholder realizes capital gains income (e.g., 
Denis and Sarin, 2002). Therefore, the primary differences in organizational form between S- 
corporations and C-corporations relate to taxes and the number and type of owners.
Given the differences and similarities between S-corporations and C-corporations, the 
question becomes what determines the choice to set up the firm as a S or C corporation and 
what is the appropriate compensation of the executives? Various factors such as number of 
shareholders, growth opportunities, business risk, size, and lines of business may contribute to 
both the choice of organizational form and level or structure of compensation. Additional 
factors likely to influence compensation include owner-manager, family ownership, and 
founder status.
We expect S-corporations to have fewer shareholders given they are faced with 
restrictions on the maximum number of shareholders. Therefore, S-corporations are less likely 
to have a highly diffiise ownership structure. As originally argued by Berle and Means (1932), 
a diffuse ownership structure may diminish incentives to shareholders to monitor management 
since the cost of monitoring likely outweighs the benefit. Since more diffuse ownership 
suggests greater agency problems, tying compensation to performance may mitigate some 
agency costs in more diffusely held firms. In addition, given the restriction on nimiber of 
shareholders, owners that choose subchapter S status may not expect to have as great a need to 
raise additional capital from new shareholders. Those choosing C-corporate status may expect 
to be in need of a larger shareholder base to support expected growth. Since ownership 
structure may also impact agency costs, we specify a variable defined as number of owners in 
the firm.
The shareholder restriction may also suggest differences in the perceived growth 
opportunities associated with the firm. If a firm has high growth opportunities, the owners may
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choose C-corporate status for the potential to draw on a larger shareholder base. Many C- 
corporations draw from their employee pool to raise additional capital or to provide ownership 
incentives through private stock grants? High growth opportunities have also been found to be 
associated with a stronger pay-performance relation (e.g., Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and 
Gaver, 1993) suggesting that C corporations may be more likely to have a stronger pay- 
performance relation than S corporations.
Differences in firm size are likely to influence compensation level and the choice of 
organizational form. One of the most well documented empirical regularities for executive 
compensation is the positive relation between executive compensation and firm size (Murphy, 
1999). We expect the relation to continue in small businesses. In addition, we expect small 
firms to be more likely to choose S-corporate status. The smaller firms will often choose S- 
corporate status since the ownership restriction becomes a non-binding constraint. Also, as 
argued by Plesko (1994), larger firms are likely to have more complicated financial and 
ownership structures making it more difficult to meet eligibility requirements for subchapter S.^
According to Cavalluzzo and Geczy (2002), S-corporations are more attractive than C- 
corporations in certain lines of business based on the Revenue Act of 1987. Plesko (1994) 
provides a breakdown of S corporation returns by major industrial sector and finds that less 
capital-intensive industries are more likely to convert from subchapter C to subchapter S. In 
addition, accounting ratios are known to vary by industry. If firms choose to tie pay to 
performance, the ratios chosen and the relation between pay and performance is likely to vary 
by industry. Therefore, we expect industry may influence both the choice of organizational 
form and compensation structure.
A related idea to growth opportunities is the risk of the underlying assets. If the risk 
differs across the organizational forms, then the monitoring of managerial performance in the 
less risky company may be easier and the need to vary compensation schemes would be 
minimal. According to Smith and Watts (1992), managerial activities are easier to observe and 
evaluate in more stable, less risky firms. Often business risk varies by industry and therefore, 
industry may influence both the choice of organizational form and compensation structure.
Bates, Jandik and Lehn (2000) find that family-owned firms pay less than non-family 
owned firms. The difference is primarily driven by lower pay to the top executive. We expect 
family ownership to be negatively related to the level of compensation for privately-held firms. 
In addition, we expect family members to more closely monitor management reducing the 
agency conflict and potentially weakening the relation between compensation and performance.
The owner/managers will have more discretion in terms of how to compensate 
themselves. The owner/managers of a C corporation are likely to choose higher wages and no 
dividends since C corporations are subject to double taxation of dividends. In the zero agency 
cost case where we have a 1 0 0 % owner manager, the owner manager reaps all the benefits from 
his or her efforts (Ang, Cole and Lin, 2000). In firms with lower agency costs, we would 
expect higher salaries for owner managers due to a more efficient utilization of assets.
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and do not provide the information necessary to value non-traded privately held stock.
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Revenue Code, Sections 1361 and 1371.
Founder status may also influence compensation level. Chung and Pruitt (1996) 
estimate a system of equations with founder/founders family dummy variables included in their 
compensation equation and find that founding CEOs or their family successors tend to receive 
less cash compensation than their non-founder counterparts, although the statistical significance 
of the relation is weak. Therefore, we do not have a clear prior on the sign for this variable but 
control for founder status in our regressions.
Finally, competition in the labor market also influences compensation. To broadly 
control for competition in the labor market, we control for firms operating in a metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA). We expect firms operating in an MSA to pay higher levels of 
compensation than those firms operating in rural areas.
2.2. Measures of performance
Since both S corporations and C corporations have unlimited life and limited liability of 
owners, owners may not actively participate in the operations or decision making of the 
business. Owners with a limited role in the business will likely use output based accounting 
measures to provide information regarding the actions of the managers. Holmstrom (1979) 
argues that noisy measures of performance can provide useful information to owners in order to 
determine appropriate levels of compensation for the corporation’s managers.
Typical proxies for executive performance for large publicly traded firms include stock 
price performance and accounting based measures of firm performance. However, for small 
privately-held firms the market value of stock prices are typically not available and therefore, 
the focus on performance is restricted to an analysis based on the firm's financial statements. 
The primary accounting measures of firm performance are profitability ratios, which measure 
how efficiently firm operations are managed to generate net income. We choose to use ROA, 
defined as net income divided by total assets, as our profitability ratio because it is the most 
commonly used performance measure in academic research to establish a pay for performance 
relation (e.g., Ke et al., 1999; Blackwell et al., 1994).
One caveat to privately held corporations utilizing ROA as the measure of firm 
performance is that previous research suggests that privately held firms more aggressively 
manage taxes (Beatty and Harris, 1999; Mikhail, 1999) and therefore, are less concerned with 
the overall net income reported. To the extent that privately held firms more aggressively 
manage taxes, ROA will be lower. Utilizing ROA as the measure of performance reduces the 
incentive to manage taxes since lowering taxes through lower earnings before taxes are 
associated with lower net income and therefore, lower levels of compensation. Therefore, as 
noted by Ke et al., we would be less likely to observe privately-held firms utilizing ROA as a 
firm performance measure for compensation purposes.
Also, since the owners are taxed differently in the different organizational forms 
available to small businesses, the firm performance measure related to executive compensation 
may vary across organizational forms based on the taxation of the owner. Since profits flow 
through to the individual owners of S-corporations, owners may have a greater incentive to 
engage in expense preference behavior to shelter income from taxation than managers of C- 
corporations. Since C-corporations are faced with the double taxation of dividends, the 
incentive to owner-managers of C-corporations is to receive cash flow payouts through 
compensation as opposed to dividends. Both the potential expense preference behavior of S- 
corporations and the higher salaries for C corporations to avoid dividend distributions will 
reduce EBIT and similarly reduce ROA for small firms. Accordingly, alternative measures of
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firm performance, other than operating performance or ROA, may be more relevant in S and C 
corporations.
Although not typically used in compensation research for large publicly traded firms, 
asset management ratios such as total asset turnover measure how efficiently the firm uses its 
assets to generate sales. Ang et al. (2000) argue that agency costs are inversely related to the 
total asset turnover ratio. They argue that managers, for example, may make poor investment 
decisions and/or exert insufficient effort, which results in lower revenues. We argue that by 
establishing a relation between total asset turnover and compensation, owners may be able to 
mitigate some agency c o s t s . I n  addition, total asset turnover is an accounting measure that is 
devoid of tax effects and is measured prior to any expense preference behavior.
In general, we expect small firms to utilize total asset turnover rather than ROA in 
evaluating performance for compensation purposes. In addition, in situations where the agency 
problems are less pronounced such as when the small firm is more closely held or has an owner 
manager, we would expect either less reliance on accounting measures of firm performance or 
more reliance on total asset turnover relative to ROA. Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) argue that the 
difference in total asset turnover between a firm whose manager is the sole equity owner and a 
firm whose manager owns less than 1 0 0 % of equity, measures agency costs that result from the 
loss in revenues attributable to inefficient asset utilization.
The pay-performance relation should reflect the ability of managers to generate cash 
flows for investors (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990 and Smith and Watts, 1992). The empirical 
question becomes which performance measure is a better proxy of cash flows for investors in 
small firms. We consider both ROA and total asset turnover as alternative proxies for 
measuring firm performance in privately held firms.
III. Data, methods, and descriptive statistics 
3.1. Data
We obtain our data from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances 
(NSSBF), co-sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board and the U.S. Small Business 
Administration. According to the Methodology Report (1996) by Price Waterhouse, the 
NSSBF report is one of the most comprehensive general-purpose databases on small businesses 
available in the public domain.^ The 1993 NSSBF provides information fi*om 5,356 completed 
interviews of a stratified random sample of small businesses operating with fewer than 500 fiill- 
time equivalent employees. Price Waterhouse reports that the data contain 4,637 usable 
responses to the survey. We exclude from the sample: (1) not-for-profit businesses, (2) 
government agencies, and (3 ) depository institutions (or non-deposit credit institutions) and any 
firms that have insufficient data based on our specified regression variables.^
After our initial data restrictions, we also analyze the data for outliers and 
comparability. We find that the number of shareholders in the initial C corporation sub-sample
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 ^A positive relation between compensation and total asset turnover would also be consistent with Welles (1995) 
who provides survey evidence from small business owners that suggests the owners rely more heavily on sales in 
determining compensation levels.
 ^ See the web site http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss for information on the NSSBF report and the 
corresponding database. Although a 1998 NSSBF survey is available on the website, it does not have the same 
compensation data available that is included in this study.
 ^For our purposes, excluding depository institutions and government entities is important since Smith and Watts 
(1992) and Gaver and Gaver (1993) argue that regulated firms have systematically different compensation 
schemes due to their restricted investment opportunity sets.
ranged from 1 to 9,000. However, only a few C corporations have over 1,000 shareholders 
with most firms having less than 200 shareholders. As noted in Table I, approximately five 
percent of the initial C corporations in the sample have over thirty shareholders. Also, seventy 
seven and seventy two percent of the S and C corporations have less than four owners, 
respectively. To avoid including firms that we suspect are systematically different than other 
firms in the sample, we restrict our sample to firms with thirty or less owners. The resulting 
sample size is 1,825 firms with 707 S-corporations and 1,118 C corporations. The survey data 
include detailed information regarding owner and organizational demographics, sources of 
financial services, income and expenses and a complete balance sheet of financial data for each 
firm.
3.2. Method
Since the choice of organizational form may be considered an endogenous variable, 
determined within the system of equations, we use two-stage least squares regression analysis. 
Otherwise, least-squares estimates of the compensation regression parameters will be biased 
and inconsistent. In order to perform the first stage of two-stage least squares, we create a new 
variable to replace the problematic causal variable by choosing instrumental variables that 
influence the choice of corporate form but are unrelated to compensation (e.g., Kennedy, 1992). 
Therefore, we begin by motivating the choice of the instrumental variables.
The primary factors that influence the choice of corporate form are taxes, types of 
shareholders a firm can have, and access to additional capital. C corporations have a broader 
group of shareholders available to them to raise capital from. Therefore, a variable that may 
capture a firm’s need to access capital and influence the choice of organizational form is 
whether the firm offered equity to new shareholders. Although Table II shows that S 
corporations are significantly more likely to raise additional capital than C corporations, C 
corporations are more likely to raise the equity from new shareholders (although the difference 
is not significant), expanding their shareholder base. The new equity variable is likely to be 
unrelated to compensation.
Young firms may choose S-corporate status for tax purposes. According to Cavalluzzo 
and Geczy (2002) and Plesko (1994), age contributes to the choice of organizational form from 
a tax perspective. When a firm is in the start up phase, costs tend to be high and losses often 
occur. To the extent that losses can offset income from other sources for the owners of S- 
corporations, they receive tax benefits from the flow through entity. All losses would stay in a 
C-corporation and be carried forward to offset future corporate income. The immediate use of 
losses for the owners of the S-corporation yields a higher present value of tax savings. In 
addition, the greater the differential between the corporate and individual tax rates, the greater 
the advantage to passing the losses through to the individual. As firms age and become more 
profitable, the differential tax rates between corporate and individual income reverses the tax 
benefit and increases the benefit of being taxed as a corporation. Therefore, a variable that may 
capture the differential tax treatment associated with S and C corporations and influence the
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Once we eliminate firms with more than 200 owners, any additional restrictions on the sample leave our results 
virtually unchanged. Therefore, to provide for comparability across the organizational forms, we restrict 
ownership to 30 owners which is the maximum number of owners in our sample of S-corporations. The 
ownership restriction causes us to drop 61 C corporations from the sample. We also analyze total assets and total 
executive salaries for outliers and eliminate four S-corporations.
choice of organizational form is the age of the firm. S corporations are significantly younger 
than C corporations as shown in Table II. Firm age has been shown to have an insignificant 
relation with compensation (e.g., Cavalluzzo and Sankaraguruswamy, 2005).
In the first stage, we regress choice of organizational form on all of the predetermined 
variables in the whole system including firm age and new equity. The dependent variable is a 
0/1 indicator variable equal to one if the firm is organized as a C corporation and zero if the 
firm is organized as a S corporation. Then, we replace the organizational form variable in the 
compensation equation that follows with the fitted variable from the first model.^
The second stage equation is our compensation model where the dependent variable is 
the aggregate level of top management compensation but depends on the choice of 
organizational form. Our compensation equation is similar to Ke et al. (1999) and Cavalluzzo 
and Sankaraguruswamy (2005):
In (salaryi) = a  + pi In(assetsi) + p2 In(agei) + p3 familyi + P4 MSAi +
p5 founderi + Pe (owner/manageri) + py number of ownersi +
Ps corporate form i + p9 performi + pio-17 industry! + £i (1)
where assets is measured as the natural log of total assets, age is the natural log of the age of 
the firm, family is a 0 / 1  indicator variable taking on the value of one if the firm has greater than 
50% ownership by a single family, MSA is a 0/1 indicator variable taking on the value of one if 
the firm operates in a metropolitan statistical area, founder is a 0 / 1  indicator variable taking on 
the value of one if the firm is managed by a founder, owner/manager is a 0 / 1  indicator variable 
taking on the value of one if the owner manages the business, number of owners is the number 
of shareholders of the corporation, corporate form is the predicted probability of a firm being 
organized as a C corporation, perform is the firm performance measure and industry is a series 
of 0/1 indicator variables based on one-digit SIC codes.
We estimate the model for the entire sample to determine if executive salaries in small 
businesses are associated with firm performance. We are restricted to measuring compensation 
in terms of levels as the data on compensation are for 1993. The levels model estimates the 
relation between the level of compensation and performance.
3.2.1. Dependent variable
The dependent variable is the total amount of annual salary paid to all top executives of 
the business. The survey question used is 'during (YEAR), what was the amount of the 
officers' compensation/guaranteed payments to partners?' Therefore, the compensation variable 
represents an aggregate measure of total cash compensation paid to executives. We interpret 
the variable to include salary and bonus. Following Ke et al. (1999), we use the natural 
logarithm of compensation in our regressions (\n(salaryi) ) .
3.2.2. Accounting-based firm performance measures
Following Ke et al. (1999) and Blackwell et al. (1994), we use ROA measured as net 
income divided by total assets. We measure total asset turnover as sales divided by total assets. 
Since the Du Pont equation defines ROA as the product of profit margin and total asset
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hinge on getting the functional form right in the first stage. Therefore, it is not necessary to use a discrete 
dependent variable model for our dummy endogenous variable, organizational form.
turnover, we also include a measure of profit margin in our regressions to determine which 
component of ROA drives any relation between ROA and executive compensation. Since 
ROA, asset turnover, and profit margin ratios are known to vary across industries, we attempt 
to control for these differences by including industry control variables in the regressions.
3.3. Descriptive statistics
Table II provides descriptive statistics for the sample. Our results focus on S- 
corporations and C corporations. Since ratios often vary systematically by industry, we analyze 
the industry composition of firms in our sample. Table II includes the SIC code breakdown of 
the firms in our sample across codes 1 through 8 .^  Our sample does not contain firms from 
codes 0 and 9. Despite our expectation that industry may influence both the choice of 
organizational form and compensation structure, our S and C corporate samples appear to be 
similarly distributed across SIC codes with the largest concentration in SIC code 5 which 
includes wholesale and retail trade. The only significant difference in industry concentration is 
a significantly greater percentage of the S corporate firms are concentrated in SIC code 7, 
Business and Entertainment Services than C corporate firms.
Table II provides fi*equencies for the indicator variables in our model (family 
ownership, founded by current owner and owner managed) and mean and medians for the 
continuous variables in our model. Analyzing the indicator variables, approximately 75 percent 
of the S-corporations and C corporations are family owned. Similarly, approximately 75 
percent of S-corporations and C corporations are owner managed. Not shown in the table, 
however, is that 58 (60) percent of the corporations (S-corporations) that are family owned are 
also owner managed. This highlights the idea that a firm can be owner managed but the firm 
does not necessarily have over 50 percent of the total firm ownership concentrated within the 
owner manager's family. Seventy (sixty-seven) percent of S-corporations (C corporations) are 
founded by the current owner.
Given that the mean and median are very different, we will focus our discussion on the 
medians of the continuous variables which will likely provide a better representation of the 
businesses in the sample. Table II shows that median executive salaries are significantly lower 
at S-corporations ($72,000) than at C-corporations ($86,000). S-corporations are also smaller 
with median total assets of $480,122 compared to median total assets of $533,915 for C- 
corporations, although the difference is not significant. In general, salary levels in Table II are 
consistent with the well documented positive relation between firm size and executive 
compensation (Murphy, 1999). When analyzing medians, regular corporations are the largest 
firms in the sample and corporate executives earn the highest salaries.
Table II also shows whether the firm is located in a Metropolitan Statistical Area. We 
expect that there is more competition for business executives in an MSA than in a rural area, 
which would influence executive compensation. The frequencies show that about 80% of the 
businesses in each organizational form are located in an MSA. So, most of the businesses in the 
sample would have competition in their immediate vicinity for executive talent.
Analyzing performance in Table II shows that median ROA is significantly higher for 
S-corporations (13 percent) than for regular corporations ( 8  percent) which is consistent with 
higher salaries for C corporate executives but may suggest that S corporate executives do not
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 ^ Depository institutions are included in SIC code 6. However, as previously noted we exclude depository 
institutions from our sample but include insurance, brokerage and real estate firms.
engage in expense preference behavior. Total asset turnover appears more consistent across the 
organizational forms ranging from 3.12 to 3.25.
The statistics in Table II show that the S-corporations in this sample tend to be smaller, 
younger, with stronger accounting performance measures than C corporations.
VI. Results
As previously stated, our goals for this study are twofold. First, we analyze whether a 
relation exists between total executive pay in small businesses and accounting-based firm 
performance measures. Second, we determine if the relation between pay and performance 
varies across the different organizational forms available to small businesses.
4.1. Entire sample
We report our second stage regression results from estimating equation (1) on the entire 
sample of small businesses in Table III. Although we include industry controls in all model 
specifications, we suppress the coefficients for brevity. The first column of results includes 
only the control variables and the corporate form indicator variable as independent variables. 
The second column of results includes the control variables, corporate form variable and ROA. 
Finally, based on the Du Pont analysis, we decompose ROA between profit margin and total 
asset turnover in the third column. The regression with only the control variables has 
substantial explanatory power. We find a positive and significant relation between executive 
salaries and firm size, if the firm operates in a metropolitan area, if the firm is owner managed, 
the founder is the owner manager and the ownership is more diffuse. Consistent with Bates, 
Jandik and Lehn (2000), we find a negative and significant relation between executive salaries 
and family ownership. Our results suggest that owner/managers provide higher executive 
compensation in small businesses while firms that have over 50 percent family ownership pay 
lower executive salaries, ceteris paribus. The corporate form variable suggests that C 
corporations pay higher executive salaries than S corporations.
When we include accounting based measures of firm performance in the compensation 
equations, both ROA and total asset turnover are significant and positive. This suggests that 
better firm performance and more efficient asset utilization is associated with higher executive 
salaries, ceteris paribus, in a broad-based sample of small businesses. The positive relation 
between the performance ratios and executive salaries in small privately-held businesses is 
particularly important because it suggests that small firms link the level of executive 
compensation to firm performance. This result is in direct contrast to the results reported in Ke 
et al. (1999). They find no relation between levels of CEO pay and ROA in privately-held 
insurance companies, which they interpret to suggest that privately-held firms use subjective 
measures to evaluate executive performance for determining executive compensation. We 
argue that Ke et al.'s findings may be specific to the insurance industry and are not 
generalizable to a broad based sample of privately held small firms.
4.2. Results for interacting organizational form and firm performance
To analyze whether organizational form impacts the use of accounting based firm 
performance measures in compensation practices, Table III also reports the second stage results 
from estimating equation ( 1) by introducing interaction variables between the corporate 
organizational form and each firm performance proxy. We find that the interaction variable 
between ROA and corporate form is insignificant in column four suggesting that executives’
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salaries in both S-corporations and C corporations are equally sensitive to ROA. The 
sensitivity of executive compensation to ROA is equivalent across organizational forms. 
Alternatively, the interaction variable between asset turnover and corporate form in column 
five is negative and significant suggesting that C corporations executive compensation 
packages are significantly less sensitive to the efficient use of assets relative to executive 
compensation packages for S corporations.^^ A test of the joint significance of the coefficient 
on asset turnover and the interaction term is significantly different from zero.
Since Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) argue that agency costs are inversely related to total 
asset turnover and S corporations have higher total asset turnover, on average, than C 
corporations as illustrated in Table II, the stronger relation between executive compensation 
packages and total asset turnover for S corporations may result from greater agency costs in S 
corporations. This result seems counter intuitive if C corporations are perceived to have greater 
growth opportunities than S corporations. Theory suggests firms with greater growth 
opportunities will have a stronger pay-performance relation. Given that S corporations tend to 
be younger, smaller firms than C corporations, S corporations may simply have more potential 
to grow since they start from a smaller base.
To fiarther analyze the difference between S and C corporation compensation practices, 
we compute predicted executive compensation levels from both model 2 and model 5 of Table
III. We begin by setting all of the significant continuous independent variables equal to their 
mean values. Then we assume our significant indicator variables are all equal to one which 
assumes the firm is family owned, owner managed, the current owner is the founder and the 
firm operates in a metropolitan area. To provide information across alternative organizational 
forms, we analyze executive salaries assuming the predicted value for being organized as a C 
corporation is equal to the 10*^  50*^  and 90^  ^ percentile values of 0.524, 0.613 and 0.704, 
respectively. We chose these values to capture the impact of an increased or decreased 
likelihood of being organized as a C corporation. We similarly allow the performance metrics 
to vary across the distribution of performance observed in the sample. We set the performance 
variables equal to the 5^ ,^ 50^  ^and 95^  ^percentile values calculated for the sample firms.
Panel A of Table IV reports the estimates of executive salaries fi*om model 2 in Table 
III utilizing ROA as the performance measure. Analyzing executive salaries for the median 
predicted probability for corporate status of .61 (column 2 ), we estimate an executive salary 
level equal to $185,880 for the median ROA in the sample. If we allow ROA to increase to the 
95‘*" percentile, executive salaries increase to $202,622, a percentage increase of 9%. If ROA 
decreases to the 5^*^ percentile, executive salaries fall to $180,596, a decline of 2.8%. This 
suggests some downward rigidity to executive wages. Given that the interactive term is 
insignificant, the variation in executive salaries is constant across alternative predicted 
probabilities for C corporate status. However, if a firm has a higher probability of being 
organized as a C corporation, executive salaries are substantially higher. For example, for 
median ROA firms, executive salaries range from $155,920 to $222,204 as the predicted 
probability of being organized as a C corporation rises from 0.52 to 0.70. These results 
illustrate the magnitude of the pay differential between executives of C versus S corporations.
Similarly, panel B of Table IV reports executive salaries calculated from model 5 of 
Table III utilizing total asset turnover as the performance measure. Analyzing executive
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Recall, that the corporate form indicator variable in the first stage regression equals 1 for a C corporation and 0 
for a S corporation. The first stage regression estimated the fitted value associated with the probability of the firm 
being organized as a C corporation.
salaries for the median predicted probability for corporate status of .61 (column 2 ), we estimate 
an executive salary level equal to $185,978 for the median level of total asset turnover in the 
sample. If we allow total asset turnover to increase to the 95^ *^  percentile, executive salaries 
increase to $231,418, a percentage increase of 24.4%. If total asset turnover decreases to the 5**^ 
percentile, executive salaries fall to $178,332, a decline of 4.1%. The results in panel B of 
Table IV similarly illustrate the downward rigidity of wages for executives but also illustrate 
the greater sensitivity of compensation to total asset turnover relative to ROA for small firm 
executives. Allowing the predicted probability for C corporate status to vary from the 10“^ to 
90^ *^  percentile illustrates the non-constant effect of changes in total asset turnover on executive 
compensation for executives. A greater probability for C corporate status reduces the 
sensitivity of wages to total asset turnover for privately held firms.
4.3. Results for independent analysis of alternative organizational forms
The two-stage least squares analysis constrains the slope coefficients of the 
determinants of executive compensation to be the same in both organizational forms. 
Assuming predictions of agency theory apply to both organizational forms, this is not a 
problem. However, it limits the ability to determine whether different firm characteristics are 
more relevant in different organizational forms. Therefore, we also provide an analysis of 
executive compensation in small businesses without controlling for the endogeneity of 
organizational form.
To determine the influence of additional firm characteristics on the sensitivity of 
executive compensation to performance in small privately held firms, we separate our firms 
based on C versus S corporate status. Since our results for total asset turnover indicate 
compensation practices differ across organizational forms, we show the results in Table V 
using total asset turnover as our proxy for firm performance.
Table V shows that the sensitivity of executive compensation to the efficient use of 
assets is lower for firms that have a current owner that is the founder independent of 
organizational form. This result is consistent with lower agency costs in firms that have owners 
who are founders of the firm. In C corporations, we find that the sensitivity of executive 
compensation to the efficient use of assets is greater for firms who are owner managed (with a 
coefficient estimate of 0 .0 1 1 ) but lower for firms with greater than fifty percent family 
ownership (with a coefficient estimate of -0.012). Thus, if a C corporation has both an owner 
manager and is family owned, the net effect on the relation between compensation and total 
asset turnover is virtually zero. Column one of Table V shows that the interaction variables for 
owner manager and family ownership are insignificant for S corporations.
V- Conclusions
In this paper we examine the hypothesis that the organizational form of small 
businesses influences the relation between executive compensation and alternative measures of 
firm performance. We draw on Holmstrom's (1979) argument that under conditions where 
complete monitoring is possible, the first best compensation contract (solution) will pay a fixed 
salary if the action desired is taken. If complete monitoring is impossible or prohibitively 
costly, then the second best solution suggests using imperfect estimators of an agent's actions. 
We employ total asset turnover and return on assets as potential proxies for an agent's actions 
and assess the relation between these proxies and executive compensation in S-corporations 
and C corporations.
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Using a broad-based sample of small businesses from the 1993 National Survey of 
Small Business Finances, we find that firm size is positively related to executive salaries. This 
is consistent with the idea that larger organizations require more qualified executives due to the 
complexity of the job. In addition, small businesses, in general, use accounting-based firm 
performance measures in determining their executive compensation. We find a positive 
relation between both ROA and total asset turnover and executive compensation. The relation 
between total asset turnover and executive salaries is weaker for C corporations than for S 
corporations. In addition, executive salaries are positively related to more diffuse ownership, 
owner managers, the founder is the current owner but negatively related to firms with greater 
than fifty percent family ownership. Additional analysis of compensation practices for S and C 
corporations reveals that the sensitivity of compensation to total asset turnover is lower for 
firms with a current owner that is a founder independent of the organizational form. Within the 
sample of firms organized as C corporations, the sensitivity of compensation to total asset 
turnover is greater for firms that are owner managed but less sensitive for firms with greater 
than fifty percent family ownership.
By establishing a relation between total asset turnover and executive compensation, 
owners of privately held firms may be able to mitigate some agency costs. As argued by Ang 
et al (2000), agency costs are inversely related to total asset turnover. In general, we find that 
privately held firms appear to structure executive compensation in a manner consistent with 
aligning the interests of owners and managers to maximize the cash flows of the firm.
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Table I
Number of Owners in the full sample of 
S-Corporations and C>Corporations
Number of Owners S-Corporation C-Corporation
1 207 29% 354 30%
2 250 35% 343 29%
3 94 13% 154 13%
4 54 8% 95 8%
5 32 5% 47 4%
6 26 4% 26 2%
7 10 1% 13 1%
8 6 1% 10 1%
9 1 0% 9 1%
10 7 1% 9 1%
11-15 12 2% 30 3%
16-20 2 0% 15 1%
21-25 4 1% 8 1%
26-30 2 0% 5 0%
31-100 na 28 2%
More than 100 na 33 3%
Total sample 707 100% 1179 100%
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Table II
Means (medians) of variables by type of corporation and for the full sample. We report the 
statistics for the raw numbers in this table without adjusting for natural logarithm.
Variable S-Corporation
N=707
C-Corporation
N=1118
Differences in 
Means (Medians)
Executive Salaries 171,870 178,224 -0.46
(72,000) (86,000) (-2.34**)
Total assets ($’s) 2,223,013 2,121,491 0.47
(480,122) (533,915) (-0.70)
Firm age (years) 15.43 17.80 -3 47***
(11.0) (14.0) (-5.62***)
Family owned 78.50% 75.58% 1.43
MSA 81.61% 84.79% -1.79*
Founder Owner 70.30% 67.62% 1.20
New equity 23.34% 18.52% 2.49**
New shareholders 3.25% 4.83% -1.63
Owner managed 76.66% 75.67% 0.48
Number of owners 2.90 3.23 -2.01**
(2.0) (2.0) (-0.20)
Profit Margin 7.45% 5.77% 1.17
(4.78%) (2.63%) (5.35***)
Asset Turnover (times) 5.88 5.89 -0.01
(3.25) (3.12) (1.22)
ROA 0.47 0.38 0.84
(0.13) (0.08) (4.52***)
SIC= 1 11.32% 13.06% -1.10
SIC = 2 8.35% 7.33% 0.79
SIC = 3 8.63% 10.11% -1.05
SIC = 4 3.54% 5.01% -1.49
SIC = 5 33.38% 33.63% -0.11
SIC = 6 5.80% 5.81% -0.01
SIC = 7 17.54% 11.54% 3.62***
SIC = 8 11.46% 13.51% -1.28
Note; Executive Salaries equals total compensation for business executives. Family Owned equals one if 50% of 
the firm’s equity is owned by one family, 0 otherwise. MSA equals one if the firm operates in a metropohtan 
statistical area, 0 otherwise. Founder Owner equals one if the firm is founded by current owner, 0 otherwise. New 
Equity equals one if the firm has issued new equity, 0 otherwise. New shareholders equals one if the firm has 
issued equity to new shareholders, 0 otherwise. Owner managed equals one if the owner manages the business 
operations, 0 otherwise. Profit Margin equals net income divided by sales. Asset Turnover equals sales divided by 
total assets. ROA equals net income divided by total assets. Industry designations include: SIC=1 for Mineral and 
Construction; SIC=2 and 3 for Manufacturing; SIC=4 for Transportation, Communications, and Utilities; SIC=5 
for Wholesale and Retail Trade; SIC=6 for Insurance, and Real Estate (exclude Financial Services); SIC=7 for 
Business and Entertainment Services; SIC=8 for Health, Legal, Educational, and Social Services. The test statistics 
reported in the last column are the t-statistics for differences in means or z-statistics for differences in medians for 
a two-sided test. For the 0/1 indicator variables the test is the Wilcoxon two-sample test with reported z-statistics.
■ \  and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively.
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Table III
Two stage least squares regressions of the natural logarithm of total salary of top managers for 
a sample of 1825 small firms. Only the second stage equation results are shown. The models 
differ based on the proxy for firm performance and including interaction terms between the 
firm performance variable and the organizational form indicator variable.
Models
Intercept
ln(total assets)
Family owned
MSA
Founder
Owner
managed
Number of 
Owners
Corporate form
ROA
ROA * Corp 
form
Profit Margin
Profit Margin* 
Corp form
Asset turnover
Asset Turnover 
*Corp form
F-statistic
Adjusted R-sq.
1
4.342***
(15.25)
0.435***
(33-15)
-0.166***
(-3.02)
0.180***
(2.74)
0.158***
(3.09)
0.155***
.
0.015**
(2.28)
1.738***
(3.67)
140.42***
0.478
4.100***
(14.19)
0.444***
(33.56)
-0.169***
(-3.07)
0.154***
(2.35)
0.167***
(3-28)
0.153***
(2-94)
0.014**
(2-04)
1.965*** 
. (4.14)
0.039***
(4.29)
132.28***
0.483
3.836***
(13.55)
0.467***
(35.24)
-0.158*** 
_(i2,94), _
0.160***
- (2.48)
0.153***
(3.06)
0.170***
(3-33)
0.014**
.(2:04)....
1.752***
(3.79)
0.055
(0.75)
0.013***
(9.46)
132.64***
0.503
4.080***
(14.11)
0.446***
(33.57)
-0.167***
(-3.03)
0.155***
(2-36)
0.167***
(3.28)
0154***
(2.96)
0.014**
(2-.Q1.)....
1 958*** 
_ i l l ^
0.057***
(3.43)
-0.026
(1-33)
123.01***
0.483
3.672***
(12.91)
0.478***
(35.56)
-0.155***
(-2.89)
0.158***
(2.48)
0.152***
(3-06)
0.167***
(3-28)
0.013**
_1L20L
1.750***
(3.80)
0.145
(1.27)
-0.151
(-1-04)
0.025***
(7.96)
-0.013***
(-4.07)
118.29***
0.507
Note: Family Owned equals one if 50% of the firm’s equity is owned by one family, 0 otherwise. MSA equals one 
if the firm operates in a metropolitan statistical area, 0 otherwise. Founder equals one if the firm is founded by 
current owner, 0 otherwise. Owner managed equals one if the owner manages the business operations, 0 
otherwise. Corporate form equals the predicted value from the first stage regression that predicts the probability 
that a sample firm will be organized as a C corporation or S corporation. ROA equals net income divided by total 
assets. Profit Margin equals net income divided by sales. Asset Turnover equals sales divided by total assets. 
Industry controls based on one-digit SIC codes are included in all regressions but not reported for brevity.
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively.
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Table IV
Sensitivity of executive compensation to changes in firm performance for various predicted
probabilities associated with organizational form
Predicted Probability for C corporate 
status (10^ ,^ 50^ *", 90^  ^percentile) 0.52 0.61
Panel A: ROA
% decrease in compensation
5 percentile of ROA (-0.65)
Median ROA (0.09)
95^  ^percentile of ROA (2.31)
% increase in compensation
-0.028
151487
155920
169963
0.090
-0.028
180596
185880
202622
0.090
Panel B: Total Asset Turnover
% decrease in compensation
5^*^ percentile of TAT (0.71)
Median Total Asset Turnover (3.18)
95^ *^  percentile of TAT (16.01)
% increase in compensation
-0.044
152620
159620
201606
0.263
-0.041
178332
185978
231418
0.244
0.70
-0.028
215888
222204
242217
0.090
-0.038
208882
217203
266209
0.226
Note: The analysis above assumes all significant continuous variables equal the mean value in the full sample and 
the significant dichotomous variables are all set equal to one. Therefore, the values above assume that the firm is 
owner managed, the current owner is the founder, the firm is family owned and the firm operates in a metropohtan 
area. The predicted probability for C corporate status is based on the results fi*om the first stage in the two-stage 
least squares analysis employed to account for the endogeneity of organizational form and executive 
compensation. Panel A reports results for ROA based on model 2 from Table III. Panel B reports results for Total 
Asset Turnover (TAT) based on model 5 from Table III.
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance & Business Ventures, Vol. 12. Iss .3 21
Table V
Least squares regressions of the natural logarithm of total salary of top managers for a sample 
of 707 S-corporations and 1118 C-corporations.
Models S corps C corps
Intercept 3.340***
(10.37)
4 21 
(15.45)
ln(total assets) 0.546***
(26.74)
0.503***
(29.21)
Family owned -0.003
(-0.03)
-0.248***
_(:.3-41)
MSA 0.256***
(2 .88)
0.210* *
(2-84)
Founder 0.463***
(4-39)
0.261 
(3-54)
Owner
managed
0.106
( 1.11)
0.157**
(2-41)
Number of 
Owners
-0.003
(-0.20)
0.006
iOJli
Profit Margin 0.214*
( 1.86)
-0.030
(-0-34)
Asset turnover 
(TAT)
0.082***
(4-11)
0.061***
(4.43)
TAT * family 0.005
(0.76)
-0.012*
TAT * founder -0.063***
(-3.65)
-0.048***
(-4-58)
TAT * owner 
managed
0.001
(0.13)
0.011 
(3.05)
TAT * number 
of owners
0.004
1L44I
0.003
ILM I
F-statistic 53.04*** 72.08
Adjusted R-sq. 0.556 0.520
Note: Family Owned equals one if 50% of the firm’s equity is owned by one family, 0 otherwise. MSA equals one 
if the firm operates in a metropolitan statistical area, 0 otherwise. Founder equals one if the firm is founded by 
current owner, 0 otherwise. Owner managed equals one if the owner manages the business operations, 0 
otherwise. Corporate form equals the predicted value from the first stage regression that predicts the probability 
that a sample firm will be organized as a C corporation or S corporation. Profit Margin equals net income divided 
by sales. Asset Turnover equals sales divided by total assets. Industry controls based on one-digit SIC codes are 
included in all regressions but not reported for brevity.
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively.
